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The metacognitive ability to introspect about self-performance varies substantially across individuals. Given
that effective monitoring of performance is deemed important for effective behavioral control, intervening to
improve metacognition may have widespread benefits, for example in educational and clinical settings.
However, it is unknown whether and how metacognition can be systematically improved through training
independently of task performance, or whether metacognitive improvements generalize across different task
domains. Across 8 sessions, here we provided feedback to two groups of participants in a perceptual
discrimination task: an experimental group (n  29) received feedback on their metacognitive judgments,
while an active control group (n  32) received feedback on their decision performance only. Relative to the
control group, adaptive training led to increases in metacognitive calibration (as assessed by Brier scores),
which generalized both to untrained stimuli and an untrained task (recognition memory). Leveraging signal
detection modeling we found that metacognitive improvements were driven both by changes in metacognitive
efficiency (meta-d=/d=) and confidence level, and that later increases in metacognitive efficiency were
positively mediated by earlier shifts in confidence. Our results reveal a striking malleability of introspection
and indicate the potential for a domain-general enhancement of metacognitive abilities.
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Metacognition refers to the ability to monitor and introspect
upon cognitive performance. An individual with good metacogni-
tion is aware of fluctuations in task performance, and appropriately
modulates their confidence level (e.g., holding higher confidence
when correct, and lower confidence when incorrect). Although
metacognitive abilities are often treated as stable characteristics of
individuals (Allen et al., 2017; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, &
Rees, 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013; Song et al., 2011), several lines
of research hint at their malleability. For instance, practicing
meditation boosts the accuracy of retrospective confidence judg-
ments about recognition memory decisions (Baird, Mrazek, Phil-
lips, & Schooler, 2014) and monitoring of decision errors can be
modulated by drugs (Hester et al., 2012; Hauser et al., 2017) and
brain stimulation (Harty et al., 2014). Moreover, recent work has
identified distinct neural substrates in the frontal and parietal lobes
supporting metacognitive monitoring across a range of tasks (Al-
len et al., 2017; Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & Margulies,
2013; Cortese, Amano, Koizumi, Kawato, & Lau, 2016; Fleming
et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013; see Fleming & Dolan, 2012, for
a review), suggesting the potential for targeted modulation of
metacognition independently of changes in first-order performance.
Previous attempts to improve metacognitive ability (confidence
calibration) through explicit instruction, practice, feedback, or a
combination of these manipulations have led to mixed results, with
some studies documenting increases, and others documenting null
findings (e.g., Adams & Adams, 1958; Bol, Hacker, O’Shea, &
Allen, 2005; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980; Nietfeld & Schraw,
2002; Renner & Renner, 2001; Sharp, Cutler, & Penrod, 1988).
One potential explanation for such heterogeneity of results is that
training may impact first-order performance, thus masking subtle
changes in metacognition because they are positively correlated
(Fleming & Lau, 2014; Sharp et al., 1988). Recent developments
in the analysis of confidence-rating data now permit the effective
isolation of metacognitive ability (the relationship between perfor-
mance and confidence) from changes in performance through
calculation of the signal detection theoretic parameter meta-d=
(Fleming & Lau, 2014; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Because
meta-d= is in the same units as first-order performance (d=) a
metacognitive “efficiency” score (meta-d=/d=) is straightforward to
calculate and indexes an individual’s metacognitive capacity with
respect to a particular level of task performance. Although training
paradigms have proven effective in other cognitive domains, such
as working memory (Constantinidis & Klingberg, 2016; Kling-
berg, 2010; Morrison & Chein, 2011; von Bastian & Oberauer,
2014) and even perceptual domains such as synesthesia (Bor,
Rothen, Schwartzman, Clayton, & Seth, 2014), it remains un-
known whether metacognitive efficiency can be improved with
practice, and whether putative metacognitive training supports
transfer to untrained tasks or domains. Given that effective mon-
itoring of performance is deemed important for effective behav-
ioral control (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Nelson & Narens, 1990),
intervening to improve metacognition may have widespread ben-
efits, for example in educational and clinical settings.
However, it remains unclear whether such an intervention is a
priori plausible for alleviating metacognitive deficits, or enhancing
baseline metacognitive performance, across a range of scenarios.
There is disagreement about the extent to which metacognitive
ability is a domain-general resource that can be applied to multiple
different tasks, or whether it comprises domain-specific compo-
nents. Recent findings suggest that confidence is encoded in a
“common currency” that can be compared across a range of
arbitrary decision scenarios (de Gardelle & Mamassian, 2014;
Faivre, Filevich, Solovey, Kuhn, & Blanke, 2017). However other
studies indicate a substantial fraction of individual variation in
metacognitive ability is domain-specific (Kelemen, Frost, &
Weaver, 2000; Morales, Lau, & Fleming, 2018), consistent with
dissociable neural correlates of perceptual and memory metacog-
nition (Baird et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2014; McCurdy et al.,
2013; Morales et al., 2018). To the extent to which metacognition
is domain-specific, training in one domain (e.g., on the computer-
ized perceptual discrimination task that we use here) may provide
only narrow benefits to metacognition in that domain and be of
limited value outside the laboratory. To evaluate the potential
benefits of training on metacognitive ability it is therefore critical
to assess whether such improvements generalize to an untrained
task or cognitive domain. A useful parallel can be drawn with the
literature on working memory training—here, meta-analysis sug-
gests that “near” transfer to closely related tasks is commonly
obtained, but evidence for far transfer is less consistent (Melby-
Lervag & Hulme, 2013). The transfer profile of metacognitive
training remains unknown.
Here we sought to investigate these questions by providing
differential feedback to two groups of participants over eight
training sessions on a perceptual discrimination task. A control
group received feedback on their objective perceptual discrimina-
tion performance, whereas an experimental group received feed-
back on the calibration of their metacognitive judgments with
respect to objective performance. Despite both groups exhibiting
similar task performance, the experimental group displayed selec-
tive enhancements of metacognitive calibration (the association
between confidence and performance) on the trained task. Further-
more, we obtained evidence for a transfer of metacognitive en-
hancements to an untrained stimulus type and to an untrained task
(recognition memory). Together our results reveal a hitherto un-
reported malleability of domain-general mechanisms supporting
metacognition and highlight the potential for generalized improve-
ments in metacognitive ability.
Method
In this section, we report how we determined our sample size,
all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the study
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012).
Participants
We set out to recruit at least 30 participants per group (60 in
total), and no data were analyzed prior to completion of data
collection. Data were collected via Amazon Mechanical Turk
(https://www.mturk.com), an online crowdsourcing platform. N 
102 adult participants completed at least the first session of the
study. Of these, eight participants were excluded from further
training because of floor or ceiling performance in the pretraining
baseline session, and a further 25 participants exited the study
before completing the full training protocol. Of the remaining 69
participants, one was excluded because of technical problems and
seven were excluded on the basis of data quality criteria explained
in detail in the following text. Final analyses were carried out on
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a dataset of 61 participants (35 women, 26 men; M age  38.1
years, age range 20–64 years). Participants were required to use
either Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox in full-screen mode to
complete the experiment on a computer(s) of their choosing.
Before participating in each session, all participants provided
informed consent as approved by the University of California, Los
Angeles Institutional Review Board (IRB#15–001476). Partici-
pants received monetary compensation in U.S. dollars (range 
$37.60–$44.60) for approximately 5 hr (M  5.33 hr) of partici-
pation over a period of 9 to 35 days (control group: M 15.5 days;
experimental group: M  15.4 days; independent samples t[59] 
0.10, p  .92).
Procedure
The experiment was divided into three phases: Phase 1, pre-
training (one session) ¡ Phase 2, training (eight sessions) ¡
Phase 3, posttraining (one session), resulting in 10 sessions in total.
Figure 1B provides an overview of the experiment timeline. Phase
1 consisted of stimulus titration and a pretraining session to eval-
uate baseline metacognitive accuracy in a series of two-alternative
forced-choice (2AFC) discrimination tasks (see the Task section
and Figure 1A). One set of tasks assessed perceptual discrimina-
tion, the other set assessed recognition memory. The tasks fol-
lowed a 2  2 factorial design crossing cognitive domain (per-
B
A
S9Titraon
4 Groups (2x2 Factorial Design)
S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8Pre-training Post-training
Training sessions with feedback
270 trials/session of percepon task
No feedback
432 trials
No feedback
432 trials
Feedback Type
Task Performance
(Control Group)
Metacognive
(Experimental Group)
Tr
ai
ne
d
S
m
ul
us Shapes N=12 N=17
Words N=20 N=12
[Percepon][Memory + Percepon] [Memory + Percepon][Percepon]
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
Conﬁdence Rang
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
Conﬁdence Rang
500ms
500ms
1500ms
max
2000ms - RT
1500ms
max
1500ms –
Conﬁdence RT
500ms
2000ms
max
2000ms - RT
1500ms
max
1500ms –
Conﬁdence RT
2000ms per smulus
+ 500ms ISI
AMPLITUDE INDOLENCE
AMPLITUDE
Memory Words TrialPercepon Shapes Trial
Figure 1. Task and session structure. Panel A: Participants were tested on both a perceptual discrimination and
recognition memory task, each involving two stimulus types: abstract shapes and words. The perceptual task
(left) comprised a two-alternative forced-choice discrimination judgment as to the brighter of two simultaneously
presented stimuli on each trial. The memory task (right) comprised an encoding phase followed by a series of
two-alternative forced-choice recognition memory judgments. Panel B: Experiment timeline. Each participant
completed 10 sessions in total: a pretraining session, eight training sessions, and a posttraining session. All four
conditions were assessed at pre- and posttraining, but only the perceptual task with a single stimulus type (shapes
or words) was trained during Sessions 2 through 9. During training sessions, the control groups received
feedback on their objective perceptual discrimination performance, whereas the experimental groups received
feedback on their metacognitive calibration. In both groups, feedback was delivered every 27 trials. See the
online article for the color version of this figure.
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ception or memory) with stimulus type (explained in detail
subsequently). Each task consisted of 108 trials, giving 432 total
trials in the pretraining session. The order of these tasks was
counterbalanced such that each participant performed both tasks in
one domain followed by both tasks in the other domain, and within
each domain the order of stimulus types was also counterbalanced.
At the start of Phase 2 participants were assigned to one of four
groups. Each group formed a cell in a 2  2 factorial design
crossing feedback type (control group vs. experimental group) and
trained stimulus type (see the Training section to follow). All
participants received training on the perceptual task only, with the
recognition memory task introduced again at posttraining to assess
transfer to a different task domain. During the training phase, each
of the eight sessions consisted of 270 trials (2,160 trials total), and
block-wise feedback was administered every 27 trials (see the
Feedback section to follow).
Phase 3, the final posttraining session, was identical to the
pretraining session Phase 1 except that stimulus titration was
omitted. Task order was counterbalanced against that used in
pretraining, such that each participant performed the task domains
(memory, perception) in the opposite order to that seen in pretrain-
ing. The order of stimulus types within each domain remained the
same.
Phase 1 lasted approximately 60 min, the eight training sessions
in Phase 2 lasted approximately 25 min each, and Phase 3 lasted
approximately 45 min. Participants were required to wait a mini-
mum of 24 hr between each session and were asked via e-mail to
complete each subsequent session within 48 hr to 72 hr of the
previous session.
Tasks
Figure 1A displays example trial timelines for the perception
and memory tasks. In the perception task, participants were pre-
sented with two images (i.e., words or shapes) and asked to
respond to the following question: “Which [image] has brighter
lines?” In the memory task, participants were first presented with
a series of images to memorize (again, words or shapes). On each
subsequent trial, one old image and one novel image were pre-
sented with the instruction to respond to the following question:
“Which [image] have you seen before?” In all tasks, after each
decision, participants were asked to rate their confidence on a
four-point scale, whereon 1  very low confidence, 2  low
confidence, 3  high confidence, and 4  very high confidence.
In the pretraining session, before beginning each task, partici-
pants completed three practice trials to become acquainted with
making perception/memory judgments and using the confidence
rating scale. Following the practice trials, we probed knowledge of
how to perform the perception/memory judgments by asking the
following comprehension question: “In the perception/memory
task, how do you decide which image to choose?” The three
response options were “which one you remember,” “which has
more lines,” and “which is brighter.” If a participant answered
either question incorrectly, they were excluded from further par-
ticipation and offered a partial reimbursement determined by the
proportion of the session completed. There were no practice trials
or comprehension questions in the posttraining session.
Training
The second phase of the study involved eight training sessions
of 270 trials each (2,160 trials in total), spread over 8 to 34 days.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of four groups in a
2  2 factorial design crossing feedback type (control group vs.
experimental group) and trained stimulus type (shapes or words).
All groups received block-wise feedback in the form of reward
(points) every 27 trials. The control groups (for both stimulus
types) received feedback on their objective perceptual discrimina-
tion performance; the experimental groups (for both stimulus
types) received feedback on their metacognitive calibration, as
determined by the average quadratic scoring rule (QSR) score. The
QSR provides a metric for how closely confidence ratings track
accuracy (Staël von Holstein, 1970) and is equal to one minus the
Brier score (Fleming & Lau, 2014). The rule underpinning each
feedback type is described in more detail in the following Feed-
back section.
To ensure that each group fully understood how points could be
earned, instructions were provided on the meaning of the feedback
schedule. Participants completed eight demonstration trials which
explained how earnings changed based on their objective perfor-
mance (control group) or the correspondence between confidence
and accuracy (experimental group). After the demonstration, par-
ticipants performed 10 practice trials in which they received full
feedback and a brief explanation. Note that in the demonstration
and practice trials, feedback was calculated on a trial-by-trial basis
and therefore differed from the block-wise feedback received in
the training sessions (see the following Feedback section). After
the demonstration and practice trials, participants were asked two
comprehension questions probing their understanding of how to
earn points. If they failed these questions they were asked to
attempt them again until they were successful.
Task Performance Titration
Throughout the entire 10-session experiment, the performance
of each participant was titrated online to achieve approximately
75% correct for all tasks except the memory-words task. This
“threshold” level of percent correct produces sufficient trials for
each signal detection theory outcome (hits, misses, false alarms
and correct rejections) for analysis of d= and meta-d= (Maniscalco
& Lau, 2012), and ensured any changes in metacognitive sensi-
tivity were not confounded by shifts in task performance.
Titration was accomplished in different ways for each task.
In the perception tasks (for both word and shapes), we imple-
mented two interleaved, weighted and transformed staircase pro-
cedures on the brightness of the images. We alternated two stair-
cases with differently weighted step sizes. In the first staircase,
after two consecutive correct responses the stimulus brightness
was decreased by two steps; after one incorrect response the
brightness was increased by four steps. In the second staircase,
after three correct responses the brightness level was decreased by
three steps, after 1 incorrect response the brightness was increased
by four steps. Note that these are not traditional n-down/one-up
procedures as the correct trial counter was not reset to zero after
each pair or triplet of correct responses. However, we found in
pilot work that this interleaved method stably converges to 75%
correct. Brightness levels were adjusted independently for word
and shape stimuli. In order to define initial brightness levels,
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participants performed a 60-trial titration block for each stimulus
type after the practice trials and before beginning the pretraining
session. The final brightness level at the end of the titration block
acted as the initial brightness level for pretraining Session 1. Each
subsequent Session 2 to 10 began with the final brightness level of
the previous session.
In the memory-shapes task, the number of stimuli in the encod-
ing period was adjusted based on the average percent correct
recorded over the previous two blocks. If average performance ex-
ceeded 75% correct, one additional image was added to the encoding
set. If performance dropped below 70% correct, one image was
removed, down to a minimum of two images. We initialized the
encoding set size at four images. Note that even though the
minimum set size was two, the underlying staircase value had no
minimum value.
For the memory-words task, we employed a fixed set size of 54
words. This larger set size was based on initial pilot data and the
procedure of McCurdy et al. (2013) and reflects the fact that
participants typically find encoding and remembering individual
words significantly easier than encoding and remembering abstract
shapes.
Feedback
Feedback in the form of points was given based on task perfor-
mance in the control group and metacognitive calibration in the
experimental group. We rewarded the control group on their
achieved difficulty level, specified as the inverse distance between
the current brightness level and the minimum brightness of 128:
difficulty 128 (brightness 128)
where brightness level  [128  256] ¡ difficulty level  [0 
128]. We chose difficulty level instead of accuracy as the relevant
performance measure because accuracy was titrated to 75%
correct in each block.
We rewarded the experimental group using the QSR. The QSR
is a proper scoring rule in the formal sense that maximum points
are obtained by jointly maximizing the accuracy of choices and
confidence ratings (Staël von Holstein, 1970). We mapped each
confidence rating onto a subjective probability correct using a
linear transformation: p(correct) 1/3  confidence/3, where
the confidence rating is  [1  4]¡ p(correct)  [0  1]. On each
trial, i the QSR score is then obtained as follows:
QSRi 1 (accuracyi p(correct)i)2
where accuracy is  [0, 1] and p(correct)  [0  1] ¡ QSR 
[0  1]. This rule ensures that people receive the highest number
of points when they are highly confident and right, or unconfident
and wrong (i.e., metacognitively accurate).
Despite feedback in each group being based on different vari-
ables, we endeavored to equate the distribution of points across
groups. We used data from an initial pilot study (without feedback)
to obtain distributions of expected difficulty level and QSR scores.
We then calculated the average difficulty level/QSR score for each
block, and fit Gaussian cumulative density functions (CDFs) to
these distributions of scores. These CDFs were then used to
transform a given difficulty or QSR score in the main experiment
to a given number of points.
Compensation
Participants were compensated at approximately $4 per hr, plus
a possible bonus on each session. Base pay for the 60-min pre-
training session was $4, for the eight 25-min training sessions $2
each, and for the 45-min posttraining session $3. Participants were
informed they had the opportunity to earn a session bonus if they
outperformed a randomly chosen other participant on that session.
In practice, bonuses were distributed pseudorandomly to ensure
equivalent financial motivation irrespective of performance. All
participants received in the range of four to seven bonuses
throughout the course of the 10-session study. Bonuses comprised
an additional 70% of the base payment received on any given
session.
In addition to the pseudorandom bonuses, all participants re-
ceived a $3 bonus for completing half (5) of the sessions and a $6
bonus for completing all (10) of the sessions. Total earnings
ranged from $37.60 to $43.90 across participants, and income did
not differ significantly between groups (control group: M 
$41.47; experimental group: M  $40.98; t[59]  0.94, p  .35).
The base payment was paid immediately after completing each
session and accumulated bonuses were paid only if the participant
completed the full 10 session experiment.
Quantifying Metacognition
Our summary measure of metacognitive calibration was the
QSR score achieved by participants before and after training. To
separately assess effects of training on metacognitive bias (i.e.,
confidence level) and efficiency (i.e., the degree to which confi-
dence discriminates between correct and incorrect trials), we also
fitted meta-d= to the confidence rating data. The meta-d= model
provides a bias-free method for evaluating metacognitive effi-
ciency in a signal detection theory framework. Specifically, the
ratio meta-d=/d= quantifies the degree to which confidence ratings
discriminate between correct and incorrect trials while controlling
for first-order performance (d=). Using this ratio as a measure of
metacognition effectively eliminates performance and response
bias confounds typically affecting other measures (Barrett, Dienes,
& Seth, 2013; Fleming & Lau, 2014). We conducted statistical
analyses on log(meta-d=/d=) as a logarithmic scale is appropriate
for a ratio measure, giving equal weight to increases and decreases
relative to the optimal value of meta-d=/d=  1.
Meta-d= was fit to each participant’s confidence rating data on a
per-session basis using maximum likelihood estimation as imple-
mented in freely available MATLAB code (http://www.columbia
.edu/~bsm2105/Type2sdt/). Metacognitive bias was assessed as
the average confidence level across a particular task and session,
irrespective of correctness.
Analysis Plan
By employing a combination of frequentist and Bayesian sta-
tistics, we aimed to assess the differential impact of the training
manipulation across groups and the transfer of training effects
across domains. To model the dynamics of training, we addition-
ally assessed the drivers of the training effect using latent change
score modeling and mediation analysis.
We first applied mixed-effects analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
to measures of metacognition including group as a between-
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subjects factor and task domain as a within-subjects factor. Com-
plementary to classical ANOVAs, we also used a Bayesian “anal-
ysis of effects” that quantifies evidence in support of transfer of
training effects across stimulus types and domains. Evidence in
support of transfer is indicated by a simpler model, without stim-
ulus or domain interaction terms, providing a better fit to the data.
Finally, by modeling our data using latent changes scores, we
gained insight into whether effects of training are dependent on
baseline metacognitive abilities. In addition, we used mediation
modeling to ask whether early shifts in confidence strategy facil-
itated later improvements in introspective ability.
Analysis of effects of training. In addition to the pretraining
exclusion criteria detailed in the preceding text, the following set of
predefined exclusion criteria was applied after data collection was
complete. One participant was excluded for performing outside the
range of 55% to 95% correct in at least one condition/session. One
participant was excluded due to their average difficulty level calcu-
lated across all sessions dropping below 2.5 standard deviations below
the group mean difficulty level. Five participants were excluded for
reporting the same confidence level on 95% of trials for three or more
sessions. Finally, trials in which either the participant did not respond
in time (response times 2,000 ms) or response times were less than
200 ms were omitted from further analysis (0.98% of all trials).
To evaluate effects of training, we compared data from the pre-
and posttraining sessions using mixed-model ANOVAs in JASP
(https://jasp-stats.org/) to assess the presence of training effects as
a function of domain and stimulus type (factors: Training 
Domain  Stimulus  Group). We coded the stimulus factor in
terms of whether the stimulus encountered during the pre- and
posttraining sessions was trained or untrained. We also used a
Bayesian “analysis of effects” in JASP to quantify evidence for
and against across-stimulus and across-domain transfer of training
effects on confidence and metacognitive efficiency (Rouder, Mo-
rey, Speckman, & Province, 2012).
Latent change modeling. To assess the dependence of train-
ing gains in the (trained) perceptual domain and the (untrained)
memory domain on baseline metacognitive abilities, we fit a
bivariate latent change score (BLCS) model to QSR scores (Kievit
et al., 2017; McArdle & Nesselroade, 1994). LCS models concep-
tualize differences between pre- and posttraining performance as
latent change factors. The basic equation of the LCS model spec-
ifies the score of individual i in domain Y at posttraining as a sum
of the score at pretraining and a change, or difference, score:
Yi.posti.preYi.preYi.
By setting the regression weight 	i.pre to 1, change scores can be
rewritten as follows:
Yi Yi.post Yi.pre.
This formulation allows the change score for memory or per-
ceptual metacognitive calibration (e.g., 
M or 
P) itself to be
modeled as being dependent on two influences, a self-feedback
process 	 and a coupling process :
MiMMi.preMPi.pre,
PiPPi.prePMi.pre,
where P and M denote the QSR scores for the perceptual and
memory domains, respectively. To simplify the model, we in-
cluded only data from the trained stimulus type in both domains.
The self-feedback parameters (	) are assumed to reflect a combi-
nation of regression to the mean, potential dependence of training
on baseline performance (e.g., the extent to which training gains
are greater for individuals with low/high baseline calibration)
and/or ceiling effects. The coupling parameters () assess the
extent to which change in one domain is dependent upon baseline
calibration in the other domain, above and beyond the effects of
self-feedback. The bivariate LCS formulation also allows estima-
tion of the extent of correlated change, reflecting the degree to
which training effects co-occur across domains, having taken into
account the coupling and self-feedback parameters.
Models were estimated in the lavaan package for R (Version
5.23; Rosseel, 2012) using full information maximum likelihood,
robust (Huber-White) standard errors and a scaled test statistic. We
assessed overall model fit via the root-mean-square error of ap-
proximation (RMSEA; acceptable fit:  0.08; good fit:  0.05),
the comparative fit index (CFI; acceptable fit: 0.95 to 0.97; good
fit:  0.97) and the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR;
acceptable fit: 0.05 to 0.10, good fit:  0.05; Schermelleh-Engel,
Moosbrugger, & Muller, 2003).
Analysis of training dynamics. To investigate the dynamics
of the training effect we calculated objective performance, meta-
cognitive bias and metacognitive efficiency separately for each of
the eight training sessions. This allowed us to visualize any pro-
gressive effects of feedback on metacognition while also estab-
lishing the stability of task performance during training sessions.
To assess whether shifts in metacognitive bias mediate the impact
of training on metacognitive efficiency, we fit mediation models
using the Mediation Toolbox for MATLAB (https://github.com/
canlab/MediationToolbox). The Mediation Toolbox uses nonpara-
metric bootstrapping, which is more robust in handling violations
to normality than traditional parametric approaches such as the
Sobel test.
Results
To quantify effects of training on both performance and meta-
cognition, we conducted mixed-model ANOVAs comparing pre-
and posttraining sessions (factors: Training  Domain  Stimu-
lus  Group). We coded the stimulus factor in terms of whether
the stimulus encountered during pre- and posttraining was trained
or untrained.
First-Order Performance
Task performance (d=) was stable across pre- and posttraining
sessions in both groups (main effect of training: F[1, 59]  0.34,
p  .56), and both groups performed similarly (main effect of
group: F[1, 59]  0.15, p  .71), as expected from the staircase
procedure (see Figure 2). When examining task difficulty (bright-
ness level, controlled by the staircase procedure), we found that
both groups achieved a higher difficulty level (lower brightness
level) following training (main effect of training: F[1, 59]  15.2,
p  .001), with a trend toward a more prominent difference
in the control group who received feedback on this quantity
(trainingcontrol: F[1, 31]  16.46, p  .001; trainingexperimental:
F[1, 28]  2.23, p  .15; Training  Group: F[1, 59]  3.14, p 
.081; see online supplemental Figure S1).
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Metacognitive Calibration
To quantify metacognitive calibration before and after training
we examined the average score achieved from the QSR. QSR
scores are highest when confidence matches accuracy on a trial-
by-trial basis—that is, when participants report higher confidence
after correct trials, and lower confidence after errors. Critically, we
observed a significant Training  Group interaction, F(1, 59) 
38.07, p  .001, driven by a robust increase in calibration in the
experimental group, F(1, 28)  25.55, p  .001, and a decrease in
the control group, F(1, 31)  13.15, p  .001 (see Figure 3 and
online supplemental Figure S2).
Having revealed a selective improvement in metacognitive cal-
ibration in the Experimental group, we next asked whether this
improvement generalized across stimulus types or domains. To
quantify the evidence for and against across-stimulus and across-
domain transfer, we performed Bayesian ANOVAs (see Table 1)
on QSR scores in the experimental group. This approach (known
as an analysis of effects; Rouder et al., 2012) analyzes all possible
models of the data (e.g., main effects only, main effects  inter-
action effect). For each effect, a Bayes factor quantifies the degree
to which the data support models including versus excluding that
effect. We found evidence in support of modeling a main effect of
training (BFinclusion  1.1  1010) and evidence against modeling
Training  Stimulus (BFinclusion  0.13) and Training  Domain
(BFinclusion  0.10) interactions (see Table 1). In other words, the
best-fitting model is one in which the training effect on QSR
scores was similar for both stimulus types (shapes and words) and
both task domains (perception and memory), supporting both
transfer to the untrained stimulus (within the trained perceptual
task) and transfer to the recognition memory task, for both stim-
ulus types. Together these results show that our metacognitive
feedback protocol was able to selectively improve the correspon-
dence between confidence and accuracy when feedback was re-
moved, and that this improvement in confidence estimation trans-
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Figure 2. First-order discrimination performance. Effect of training on first-order performance (d=) in the
control group (who received feedback on perceptual discrimination performance) and the experimental group
(who received feedback on their metacognitive judgments) as a function of whether the judgment was made on
a perception (red) or memory (blue) trial, and on the trained (filled) or untrained (unfilled) stimulus type. Error
bars represent between-subjects SEM. P  perception; M  memory. See the online article for the color version
of this figure.
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ferred both to an untrained stimulus type and an untrained task
(recognition memory).
Metacognitive Efficiency and Bias
Recent approaches distinguish between two key aspects of
metacognitive performance (Fleming & Lau, 2014). The first is
efficiency: How accurately do participants discriminate between
correct and incorrect trials for a given level of first-order task
performance? The second is bias: Are participants generally more
or less confident in a particular task or condition? Using a signal
detection theory approach, we sought to reveal whether metacog-
nitive improvements due to training were due to changes in effi-
ciency, bias or both. The ratio meta-d=/d= quantifies the efficiency
with which confidence ratings discriminate between correct and
incorrect trials while controlling for first-order performance (d=;
Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Bias was assessed as the average
confidence level irrespective of whether a trial was correct or
incorrect.
When analyzing metacognitive efficiency (log[meta-d=/d=]), we
observed a significant Training  Group interaction, F(1, 59) 
6.96, p  .011, driven by a selective increase from pre- to post-
training in the experimental group (trainingexperimental: F[1, 28] 
6.72, p  .015; trainingcontrol: F[1, 31]  1.39, p  .25; bottom
row of Figure 4). Improvements in metacognitive efficiency were
also accompanied by an overall increase in metacognitive bias
(confidence level; trainingexperimental: F[1, 28]  73.87, p  .001;
trainingcontrol: F[1, 31]  3.77, p  .061; Training  Group: F[1,
59]  49.35, p  .001; see the top row of Figure 4).
In a Bayesian analysis of effects, we found positive evidence
against the inclusion of a Training  Stimulus interaction term for
both metacognitive bias and metacognitive efficiency (see Table
1). In other words, the best-fitting model was one in which the
training effect was similar for both stimulus types, supporting the
existence of transfer to the untrained stimulus. However, there was
equivocal evidence for or against transfer across domains (the
Training  Domain interaction term) for both metacognitive bias
and metacognitive efficiency, suggesting our data cannot support
or refute domain-general training effects when examining these
components separately.
Latent Change Modeling
To identify potential drivers of improvements in metacognitive
calibration, we fit bivariate latent change score (LCS) models to
the QSR score data. Specifically, we examined the interrelation-
ship between changes in calibration for perception and memory
from pretraining (T1) to posttraining (T2; restricted to scores
obtained for the trained stimulus type). We assessed the evidence
for five possible parameters in the model. First, does baseline
perceptual calibration predict the degree of change in perceptual
calibration (self-feedback parameter) and/or memory calibration
(coupling parameter)? Similarly, does baseline memory calibration
predict the degree of change in memory calibration (self-feedback
parameter) and/or perceptual calibration (coupling parameter)?
Finally, is there evidence for correlated improvements (covariance
of change) in perceptual and memory calibration across individu-
als?
Before fitting the bivariate model, we first fitted two univariate
LCS models to each domain separately. In these models, the meanTa
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and variance of pretraining scores was constrained to be equal
between the experimental and control groups. The memory model
fitted the data well: 2(2)  0.72, p  .70; RMSEA  0.001, 90%
confidence interval (CI) [0.000, 0.265]; CFI  1.000; SRMR 
0.083. The equivalent perceptual model revealed a poor model fit,
2(2)  2.43, p  .30; RMSEA  0.084, 90% CI [0.000, 0.380];
CFI  0.91; SRMR  0.132, which further examination indicated
was driven by a higher variance of pretraining QSR scores in the
experimental compared with the control group. Allowing the vari-
ance of T1 scores to differ between groups restored good model fit:
2(1)  0.62, p  .43; RMSEA  0.001, 90% CI [0.000, 0.439];
CFI  1.000; SRMR  0.046. We thus allowed perceptual T1
variance to differ between groups in the bivariate LCS model
considered below. As expected, both univariate models showed
evidence for positive change in QSR scores for the Experimental
group (unstandardized change score intercepts—perception: 0.80,
SE  0.067, z  11.9; memory: 0.64, SE  0.086, z  7.50) but
not the control group (perception: 0.19, SE  0.17, z  1.10;
memory: 0.089, SE  0.10, z  0.87).1
We next tested for interrelationships between perception and
memory calibration in a bivariate LCS model (shown graphically
in Figure 5; significant paths are shown as thicker lines). The
bivariate LCS model showed good model fit: 2(4)  3.20, p 
.53; RMSEA  0.001, 90% CI [0.000, 0.247]; CFI  1.000;
SRMR  0.071. Fitted model parameters are shown separately for
the control and experimental groups in Figure 5. In addition to the
expected significant latent change intercepts in the Experimental
group (i.e., increasing scores), the self-feedback parameters were
also positive in the Experimental group for both perception and
memory, indicating that greater gains in response to training were
found in individuals who started off with low metacognitive abil-
ity. Notably self-feedback effects were not observed in the Control
group, indicating that this pattern of results is unlikely to be due to
regression to the mean or repeated testing (constraining coupling
and self-feedback parameters to be equal across groups led to a
significantly worse model fit; 
2(4)  21.16, p  .001. The
coupling parameter from perception at T1 to memory at T2 was
also negative—individuals who started out lower in perceptual
calibration improved more on memory calibration, over and above
any effect of the self-feedback parameters. Finally, there was no
evidence for correlated change between domains in the Experi-
mental group. Together this analysis indicates that effects of meta-
cognitive training depend on baseline metacognitive abilities, both
within and across domains.
1 Note that these intercept parameters can be interpreted only in the
context of the full LCS model that includes the self-feedback pathway.
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Figure 4. Effects of training on components of metacognition. Effects of training on metacognitive bias
(confidence level; top panels) and metacognitive efficiency (log[meta-d=/d=]; bottom panels). The left-hand
column shows data from the control group; the right-hand column shows data from the experimental group.
Metacognitive efficiency (log[meta-d=/d=]) gradually improved over training in the experimental group (bottom
panel) in the absence of changes in first-order performance. Error bars represent between-subjects SEM. One
participant was excluded when plotting mean log(meta-d=/d=) for Session 6 due to a negative value of meta-d=
precluding a log-transform. P  perception, M  memory. See the online article for the color version of this
figure.
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Dynamics of Metacognitive Bias and Efficiency
Figure 4 indicates that a shift in metacognitive bias (confidence
level) in the experimental group occurred immediately on the first
training session (see also online supplemental Figure S3), whereas
metacognitive efficiency (meta-d=/d=) increased more gradually
over the eight training sessions. To further quantify differences in
these time courses we calculated the session-to-session change in
confidence and metacognitive efficiency (see Figure 6A). The
peak change in confidence was reliably earlier than the peak
change in efficiency (see Figure 6B; t[28]  3.67, p  .001). To
assess whether early changes in confidence were associated with
later shifts in metacognitive efficiency, we fit a mediation model
(see Figure 6C). Consistent with such a hypothesis, the impact of
feedback type (i.e., group) on increases in log(meta-d=/d=) was
positively mediated by initial shifts in confidence, t(58)  2.24,
p  .028.
Discussion
Here we reveal a domain-general enhancement of metacognitive
abilities despite objective performance (d=) remaining unchanged
across two distinct perceptual and memory tasks. These changes
were only observed when feedback was targeted to metacognitive
judgments—an active control group who performed the same tasks
but received feedback on first-order (objective) performance did
not show the same improvement. Since feedback and financial
incentives were matched across groups, motivational factors are
unlikely to account for our results. Our findings are instead con-
sistent with a specific effect of metacognitive feedback in enhanc-
ing participants’ ability to introspect about self-performance.
In addition to a main effect of training on a trained stimulus
type, we obtained evidence that improvements in calibration scores
generalized both to other instances of brightness discrimination
and, more importantly, an untrained task (recognition memory).
This result indicates that the feedback individuals receive on their
confidence-accuracy relationship on one task can lead to improved
confidence calibration for unrelated tasks, after feedback is re-
moved. Current evidence for a shared neurocognitive resource for
metacognition is ambiguous, partly due to a difficulty of distilling
metacognitive processes from those supporting primary task per-
formance (Ais, Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2016; Baird et
al., 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013; Song et al., 2011). The observa-
Figure 5. Estimated parameters for the bivariate latent change score model of metacognitive calibration
(quadratic scoring rule [QSR] scores). Calibration scores were modeled pretraining (T1) and posttraining (T2)
across both domains, restricted to the trained stimulus type. Unstandardized parameter estimates are given
separately for each group (with standard errors in parentheses). Solid lines indicate parameter significance at p
.05. Note that the T1 covariance, T1 intercepts and T1 memory variance were constrained to be equal across
groups. T1 perception variance was estimated separately for each group as explained in the text. Per 
perception; Mem  memory. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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tion of domain-general enhancement provides a novel perspective
on this issue, suggesting the existence of generic metacognitive
resources that can be altered through training. Previous work has
suggested confidence estimates are compared in a “common cur-
rency” across a range of decision scenarios (de Gardelle & Ma-
massian, 2014; Faivre et al., 2017), and training may boost the
fidelity of such shared signals. In turn our findings hold promise
for the future development of training protocols to boost metacog-
nition in applied settings, in which administering domain-specific
adaptive training protocols may facilitate improvements in meta-
cognitive abilities more generally.
Latent change score modeling of QSR scores indicated that
baseline performance in both trained and untrained tasks (percep-
tion and memory) predicted the extent of training gains, with lower
baseline levels in a particular domain predicting greater training
gains in that domain. In addition, there was evidence for a cross-
domain coupling in which lower initial scores on the trained
(perceptual) task predicted greater gains in the untrained memory
task, over and above effects of self-feedback. These effects were
not observed in the active control group, making explanations of
such dynamics in terms of regression to the mean or repeated
practice less likely. Interestingly a similar pattern has been ob-
served in the literature on working memory training, with the
largest training gains observed for those initially low in WM
capacity (Zinke, Zeintl, Eschen, Herzog, & Kliegel, 2012, 2014;
although see Bissig & Lustig, 2007). Such findings are potentially
consistent with initially low performing individuals having a larger
(underused) latent potential for WM/metacognition, therefore lead-
ing to a stronger response to training. A less interesting explana-
tion is that there are ceiling effects on potential QSR scores,
leading to a natural slowdown in gains as a function of starting
point. Future work (for instance examining the effects of training
over multiple time points, and/or with larger N to more precisely
estimate the dynamics and cover a wider range of ability levels) is
needed to disentangle these possibilities.
We also examined how two key components of metacogni-
tion—metacognitive efficiency (meta-d=/d=) and metacognitive
bias (confidence level)—evolved over the course of training. For
both components, we observed significant effects of training in the
experimental group. However, when examining transfer for each
component individually, the picture was more mixed than for the
composite calibration measure: while both components general-
ized to other instances of brightness discrimination, there was
equivocal evidence for across-domain transfer to memory meta-
cognition. This pattern of results is potentially consistent with a
domain-specificity of metacognitive efficiency for perception ver-
sus memory (Baird et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2014; McCurdy et
al., 2013), and recent observations that metacognitive efficiency,
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impact of feedback type on later increases in metacognitive efficiency. Values outside of parentheses indicate
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of this figure.
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while stable within a particular participant across sessions, may be
idiosyncratic to particular tasks (Ais et al., 2016). However, we
note initial metacognitive efficiency scores for the memory task
were high, potentially leading to a ceiling effect on subsequent
improvement in this domain. In addition, it remains to be deter-
mined whether enhancements of perceptual metacognitive effi-
ciency are limited in transfer to other features within the same
modality (such as visual contrast and orientation; Song et al.,
2011) or also generalize to other perceptual modalities, such as
audition (Faivre et al., 2017).
The time course of training effects provides insight into poten-
tial mechanisms supporting metacognitive improvement. Although
confidence levels increased during the very first training session
and remained stable throughout the remainder of the experiment,
metacognitive efficiency climbed more gradually across the eight
training sessions. One possible account of this pattern (supported
by a mediation analysis) is that an initial shift in confidence
strategy facilitates later increases in metacognitive efficiency al-
lowing, for instance, higher confidence to be effectively targeted to
correct trials (see online supplemental Figure S2). An implicit
signal of whether a first-order decision is likely to be correct may
then gradually become associated with higher confidence reports
over time, and reinforced by the feedback schedule.
It is important to note that an initial shift in confidence bias does
not necessarily reflect a change in metacognition, and may instead
reflect a strategic shift in response to the onset of feedback pro-
tocol and instructions. Critically, however, such a strategic shift
alone is unlikely to explain later change in metacognitive effi-
ciency. To establish the expected impact of a nonspecific bias on
measures of metacognitive efficiency, we conducted numerical
simulations in which the pretraining confidence data were shifted
to create an artificial bias in confidence level (see online supple-
mental Figure S6). These simulations show that “learning” to
increase mean confidence leads to an increase in calibration score,
as expected, but is insufficient to produce the observed increases in
metacognitive efficiency. Indeed, when confidence bias is artifi-
cially induced, metacognitive efficiency is expected to be lower
post- compared with pretraining—precisely the opposite of what
we find. Thus we believe that these simulations lend support to a
conclusion that metacognitive efficiency is specifically increased
following feedback on metacognitive judgments, and this effect is
not a trivial consequence of strategic biases in confidence.
Our work goes significantly beyond previous attempts to im-
prove the resolution or calibration of confidence judgments. Ad-
ams and Adams (1958), Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980), and
Sharp et al. (1988) reported changes in the confidence-accuracy
relationship for participants who received feedback on the correct-
ness of their confidence ratings but lacked active control groups or
controls for changes in performance (although Sharp et al., 1988,
were aware of this issue). Indeed, participants in the feedback
condition of Adams and Adams (1958) reported feeling markedly
more enthusiastic about the experiment, suggesting motivation
differences may have confounded effects of feedback. Here we
addressed this concern by matching feedback schedules and first-
order performance levels between the experimental group and an
active control group, who received equivalent feedback directed at
first-order performance. Intriguingly, the feedback protocol imple-
mented in the present study may represent one among many
possible methods for inducing increases in metacognitive effi-
ciency (Lebreton et al., 2018). Other feedback protocols may
operate via a different mechanism, for example, learning to de-
crease error trial confidence, rather than increasing one’s confi-
dence in being correct. Future work could investigate the scope of
possible training protocols by manipulating parameters such as
titrated performance level and feedback schedule.
Fine-grained introspective ability is useful for several reasons.
First, it aids the control of task performance—becoming aware of
making suboptimal choices is a useful signal for prompting
changes of mind (Folke, Jacobsen, Fleming, & De Martino, 2016)
and for the guidance of learning (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Nietfeld
& Schraw, 2002; Purcell & Kiani, 2016). Second, appropriate
sensitivity to self-performance is important when interacting with
others (Bahrami et al., 2010; Shea et al., 2014), allowing commu-
nication of degrees of belief to improve group decision-making
and avoid overconfident testimony (e.g., in an eyewitness context;
Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000). Finally, metacognition
is a potential target of interventions in psychiatric disorders in-
cluding schizophrenia and depression (Moritz & Woodward,
2007). Developing tools to improve metacognitive abilities may
therefore have widespread impact in a variety of settings. Here,
despite obtaining evidence for generalization to an untrained task,
such “transfer” was limited to a suite of computerized, two-
alternative forced choice tasks with confidence ratings. Further
work is needed to assess whether metacognitive training has more
widespread benefits for unrelated tasks and/or for learning con-
texts that place demands on metacognitive control.
Our results open up new questions regarding the nature of the
malleability of metacognition displayed in the present study. Spe-
cifically, the duration and generality of improvements in introspec-
tive abilities remain to be determined. We might expect improve-
ments in the ability to introspect about self-performance to be
accompanied by changes in brain structure, function, and/or con-
nectivity within frontoparietal networks previously implicated in
supporting metacognition (Allen et al., 2017; Baird et al., 2013;
Cortese et al., 2016; Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Fleming et al., 2010;
McCurdy et al., 2013). A distinction has recently been drawn
between lower-level (and potentially generic) signals of confi-
dence and higher-order elaboration of such signals for use in
communication and control (Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Morales et
al., 2018). By combining the current behavioral intervention with
neuroimaging measures it may be possible to determine whether
one or both of these levels of processing are affected by metacog-
nitive training. Ongoing work in our laboratory is tackling this
question.
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